



"Reducing Regulatory and Technological Barriers to Demand Side Participation"

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Why does it matter?



- Building ever more generation and transmission to serve peak demand is costly
 - carbon pricing will increase these costs further
- Essential to ‘do more’ in load management space
- Risk of regulatory frameworks being slow to adjust, and inhibiting change
 - regulatory authorities must act to minimise this risk

What can frameworks do?



- Create incentives for regulated networks to use demand response efficiently
- Support and reward network technical and service innovation
- Facilitate funding for policy-driven capital programs, e.g. 'smart' grids and meters
- Facilitate wholesale market trading of demand response and new retail market tariffs and services
- Provide system operators with full access to demand response in managing unexpected capacity shortages

What should frameworks avoid



- Unnecessarily limiting the role that commercial incentives can play in delivering solutions at efficient cost
- Failing to recognise the value that consumers – and societies – place on energy use

Findings and challenges from our analysis (1)



- Price caps provide incentives for network procurement of demand response but some obstacles
 - Conservative mind-set of network businesses
 - Technological limitations
- Technology can unlock much larger load management opportunities, but is costly and raises particular regulatory challenges:
 - What load control ‘services’ do networks provide to retailers?
 - How ‘bundled’ or accessible are these services?
 - What incentives for quality, and regulation of access and price – so that benefits flow to consumers?

Findings and challenges from our analysis (2)



- Regulatory challenges over how to allocate risk of capital investment for technological innovation
- If risks underwritten by consumers, then protections needed:
 - Technology trials, e.g. Australian government “Smart Grids, Smart Cities” initiative
 - Risk-sharing ‘innovation incentives’ for network businesses
- Role for network pricing in signaling costs to be traded off against the benefits
 - in some cases it will be more efficient to augment the network than to curtail the load

Findings and challenges from our analysis (3)



- **Wholesale markets – many routes to market:**
 - Direct participation, e.g. ‘spot price pass through’ retail contracts
 - Indirect participation, e.g. bilateral contracts with retailers, demand response sold as a hedge contract
- **Reliability management**
 - Potential for demand response to help manage unexpected capacity shortfalls
 - Prudent risk management in times of change
 - Mechanisms for timely procurement by system operator
 - Care needed in design to avoid diluting market incentives to offer capacity